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I. MORAL DECISIONS UNDER SEVERE UNCERTAINTY
In the spring of 2009, a novel strain of the H1N1 inﬂuenza virus, containing
a never before witnessed combination of gene segments from human inﬂu-
enza, two forms of swine inﬂuenza, and avian inﬂuenza,1 was declared a
global pandemic. The UK Government had to decide whether to undertake,
at a cost of £1.2 billion (USD 1.9 billion at the time, equivalent to 1 percent
of that year’s health budget), an extensive set of preparatory measures,
including the purchase of both antiviral medication and a novel vaccine in
quantities sufﬁcient to cover the entire UK population, or whether instead
to take substantially less costly measures, which would involve having only
a limited supply of these medicines and vaccines at hand.2 The possible
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scenarios presented by civil servants to the government involved greatly
varying degrees of disease spread and severity: the “reasonable range” of
possibilities extended from a few hundred fatalities to 65,000 deaths, and
government planning for a ﬂu pandemic called for consideration of the pos-
sibility that there would be up to 750,000 deaths. (A normal seasonal ﬂu
kills between 2,000 and 4,000 people in the United Kingdom.) On profes-
sional estimates, the widespread use of antivirals and universal availability
of the newly developed vaccines had the potential to signiﬁcantly lower the
death rate in the worse scenarios, but it was unclear by how much. Because
of the limited data available about the severity and speed of spread of the
virus as well as about the effectiveness of the novel vaccine and antivirals,
expert advisors and key decision-makers believed they did not have sufﬁ-
cient grounds for assigning precise probabilities to the possible outcomes of
the two principal policy alternatives in front of them. The UK Government
was, therefore, in a situation of quite severe uncertainty, in the sense
famously articulated by John Maynard Keynes:
By “uncertain” knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to dis-
tinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The
game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; (…). Even
the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am
using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is
uncertain, or the price of copper (…). About these matters there is no
scientiﬁc basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.
We simply do not know.3
Following seminal work by Daniel Ellsberg, this form of uncertainty is also
commonly referred to in the economic literature as “ambiguity.”4 An
uncertain (or ambiguous) situation so deﬁned contrasts with a merely
risky situation in which the decision-maker is in a position to assign
precise probabilities to all relevant potential outcomes of the alternatives
they have to choose between. We emphasize that in the senses in which
3. John Maynard Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 51 (1937): 209–23, at pp. 213–4. See also Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Proﬁt
(Boston, MA: Hart, Schaffner and Marx, 1921).
4. Daniel Ellsberg, “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 75 (1961): 643–69. See also Richard Bradley and Mareile Drechsler, “Types of
Uncertainty,” Erkenntnis 79 (2014): 1225–48.
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we use these terms, both “risk” and “uncertainty” are subjective notions—
they pertain to the beliefs about the chances of all relevant outcomes of
their decisions that a rational decision-maker is in a position to form on
the basis of their prior beliefs and the evidence available to them.
Uncertain situations in this sense are common. For example, with
regard to many policy-relevant possibilities, the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) reports only probability intervals, because the
best available information does not sufﬁce for the assignment of precise
probabilities. That is, they make statements of the following kind:
It is likely [ofﬁcial translation: there is a chance between 0.66 and 1]
that land temperatures over Africa will rise faster than the global land
average, particularly in the more arid regions.5
Uncertainty also arises in private decisions, such as when a doctor is
considering a novel drug for multiple sclerosis for their patient, and the
evidence, combined with the decision-makers’ prior beliefs, does not per-
mit them to nonarbitrarily assign precise probabilities to this treatment’s
effects.6
Given the ubiquity of uncertainty, it is striking that the philosophical
discussion of the requirements of egalitarian distributive justice under
uncertainty is far less developed than it is for conditions of risk.7 Here, we
5. IPCC, “Africa,” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B:
Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. Christopher Field, Vincente Barros, David
Dokken, Katharine Mach, Michael Mastrandrea, T. Eren Bilir, Monalisa Chatterjee, Kristie
Ebi, Yuka Otsuki Estrada, Robert Genova, Betelhem Girma, Eric Kissel, Andrew Levy, Sandy
MacCracken, Patricia Mastrandrea, and Leslie White (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), pp. 1199–243 at p. 1202. For discussion of the sources of severe uncertainty in climate
science, see Geoffrey Heal and Antony Millner, “Uncertainty and Decision Making in Climate
Change Economics,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 8 (2014): 120–37.
6. See, for example, Gustavo Saposnik, Angel Sempere, Daniel Prefasi, Daniel Selchen,
Christian Ruff, Jorge Maurino, and Philippe Tobler, “Decision-making in Multiple Sclerosis:
The Role of Aversion to Ambiguity for Therapeutic Inertia among Neurologists,” Frontiers in
Neurology 8 (2017), article 65.
7. The literature on egalitarian distributive justice under risk is voluminous. For some
recent contributions, see Marc Fleurbaey, “Assessing Risky Social Situations,” Journal of
Political Economy 118 (2010): 649–80; Johann Frick, “Contractualism and Social Risk,” Philos-
ophy & Public Affairs 43 (2015): 175–223; David McCarthy, “Distributive Equality,” Mind
124 (2015): 1045–109; and Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey, “Priority or Equality for
Possible People?” Ethics 126 (2016): 929–54. By contrast, the philosophical literature on
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take a step toward remedying this lack. We take as our point of departure
a recent, pluralist egalitarian theory of distributive justice under risk. We
propose and defend a novel extension of this view for uncertain situations
and trace some key implications for policy decisions.
We proceed as follows. In Section II, we summarize the egalitarian view
for decision-making under risk that we take as our point of departure. In
Section III, we introduce a cautious or “uncertainty-averse” decision crite-
rion that we will appeal to throughout. On this criterion, uncertainty rep-
resents a burden in the sense that it reduces the value of a prospect. In
subsequent sections, we explore novel implications generated by the inter-
play of the twin aims of reducing the burden of uncertainty and limiting
inequality. In Section IV, we discuss cases where these aims are congru-
ent. We show that our view provides novel reasons to direct resources
toward those who have worse prospects or outcomes than others. In
Section V, we consider cases where uncertainty aversion and inequality
aversion are in tension. We show that our view weakens the egalitarian
impulse to ensure that everyone sinks or swims together, because it gives
great weight to eliminating the possibility of collective misfortune. In
Section VI, we provide a new perspective on the debate between utilitar-
ians and egalitarians. We demonstrate that if aversion to uncertainty is
permissible, then utilitarians cannot wield a favorite argument against
egalitarianism under uncertainty has focused rather narrowly on the question whether egali-
tarian principles can be derived from John Rawls’s veil of ignorance, which creates an uncer-
tain situation by denying people knowledge of the probability of ending up in any particular
social position. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1999), p. 134; Leon Ellsworth, “Decision-Theoretic Analysis of Rawls’ Original
Position,” in Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Volume II: Epistemic and
Social Applications, ed. Clifford Alan Hooker, James Leach, and Edward McClennen
(Dordrecht: Springer, 1978), pp. 29–45; Alexander Kaufman, “A Satisfactory Minimum Con-
ception of Justice: Reconsidering Rawls’s Maximin Argument,” Economics and Philosophy
29 (2013): 349–69; and H. Orri Stefansson, “Ambiguity Aversion behind the Veil of
Ignorance,” unpublished manuscript. For a rare exception to the veil of ignorance approach
among philosophers, see Caspar Hare, “Risk and Radical Uncertainty in HIV Research,”
Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (2017): 87–9.
Environmental welfare economists, however, have begun to discuss how to evaluate poli-
cies in the face of the severe uncertainties involved in climate change. See Antony Millner,
Simon Dietz, and Geoffrey Heal, “Scientiﬁc Ambiguity and Climate Policy,” Environmental
and Resource Economics 55 (2013): 21–46; and Heal and Millner, “Uncertainty and Ambiguity
in Environmental Economics: Conceptual Issues,” unpublished manuscript on http://
personal.lse.ac.uk/MILLNER/Site/Home.html. Accessed August 24, 2018.
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egalitarians. We summarize our principal ﬁndings and their relevance for
a range of policy decisions in Section VII, where we also return to our
opening H1N1 inﬂuenza case.
Before proceeding, we emphasize that our aim is merely to propose an
egalitarian view that incorporates a set of rationally and morally permissible
(rather than required) differential attitudes toward risk and uncertainty. In
the service of this aim, we assume orthodox decision theory under risk,
because leading alternatives to the orthodoxy under risk see conformity
with the orthodoxy as rationally permissible.8 However, we pair it with an
unorthodox (although well known) decision principle under uncertainty,
which yields the orthodoxy in the special case in which the decision-maker
assigns precise probabilities to each outcome. The challenges to the ortho-
doxy posed by uncertainty are unique, because they involve a decision-
maker lacking the grounds for forming reasoned beliefs of the kind that play
a central role in making the orthodoxy plausible. It is therefore coherent,
and indeed common, to endorse the orthodoxy in risky cases but not in
cases of uncertainty.9 This approach also allows us to focus squarely on
unexplored issues involved in confronting uncertainty.
II. EGALITARIANISM UNDER RISK
In this section, we describe the egalitarian view for decisions under risk
that we aim to extend to uncertain cases. To proceed at pace to novel
ideas in subsequent sections, we do not offer a full defense of this view,
which is provided elsewhere.10 We shall refer to it as follows:
Pluralistic egalitarianism: We should aim to improve people’s prospects
for well-being, raise total well-being, and reduce inequality in both
8. See, for example, Lara Buchak, Risk and Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013).
9. See, for example, Gilboa and David Schmeidler, “Maxmin Expected Utility with
Non-Unique Prior,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 18 (1989): 141–53; Peter Klibanoff,
Massimo Marinacci, and Sujoy Mukerji, “A Smooth Model of Decision Making under
Ambiguity,” Econometrica 73 (2005): 1849–92; and Ken Binmore, Rational Decisions
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
10. See Fleurbaey, “Assessing Risky Social Situations;” Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, “Priority
or Equality;” and Michael Otsuka and Voorhoeve, “Equality versus Priority,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Distributive Justice, ed. S. Olsaretti (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018),
pp. 65–85.
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people’s prospects and in their ﬁnal well-being (how well their lives
end up going).
With respect to each individual’s fate, we will assume that we are con-
cerned with the distribution of a cardinal, interpersonally comparable
measure of lifetime well-being derived from idealized preferences satisfy-
ing the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms under risk. On this measure, a
prospect has higher expected well-being for a person just in case it would
be preferred after rational and calm deliberation with all pertinent infor-
mation while attending to that person’s self-interest only.11 One prospect
has the same expected well-being as another prospect for a person just in
case such deliberation would yield indifference between the two
prospects.
To illustrate our egalitarian view under risk, imagine the following situ-
ation of a resource allocation manager in the National Health Service.
Two 10-year-old children, Ann and Bea, have just been diagnosed with an
illness which, if untreated, will leave them completely blind and with a
lifetime well-being of 50 (a moderately good quality of life); if fully cured,
each would have a lifetime well-being of 80 (a very good quality of life).12
Both are strangers to the decision-maker and to each other. Unfortunately,
the resources at the decision-maker’s disposal do not sufﬁce to fully cure
both Ann and Bea for sure. Below, we will describe the alternatives open
to them. To link up with Ellsberg’s paradigmatic presentations of risky and
uncertain alternatives, risk will be represented by a random draw from an
urn which is known to contain only 50 red balls and 50 black balls.13
11. This measure does not presuppose a speciﬁc view on what well-being is. One can hold
that two alternatives yield the same expected well-being for a person precisely when they
would, if ideally rational and wholly self-interested, be indifferent between these alternatives
while also holding that well-being does not consists of preference satisfaction. For one might
maintain that well-being consists of something other than preference satisfaction and that
the speciﬁed idealized preferences fully track the size of this other thing. See Otsuka and
Voorhoeve, “Why It Matters that Some Are Worse Off than Others: An Argument against the
Priority View,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37 (2009): 171–99, at pp. 172–3, n. 3.
12. The numbers given for life-time well-being correspond roughly to those yielded by the
well-known Health Utilities Index, Mark III (which is a von Neumann-Morgenstern measure
of health-related well-being), for, respectively: living 10 years in full health followed by
70 years being completely unable to see; and living 80 years in full health. See The Health
Utilities Index, Mark III. http://www.healthutilities.com/hui3.htm. Accessed July 25, 2017. On
this scale, zero well-being is a life of equivalent value to the person to never having existed.
13. Ellsberg, “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
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(Although it may seem odd to speak of providing treatments that are effec-
tive conditional on the draw of a ball of a particular color from an urn, this
is merely a device to depict treatments for which the decision-maker ratio-
nally assigns precise probabilities to each possible outcome.) Table 1 lists
the ﬁnal well-being for Ann and Bea given each possible draw from this
urn for each of the alternatives we will presently consider.14 We use redr
and blackr to represent the possible draws from this risky urn, and pred
and pblack for the probability of these draws. Throughout, for simplicity,
we will consider only Ann’s and Bea’s well-being; we will not consider
how their level of well-being relates to that of further people.
Suppose ﬁrst that the decision-maker must choose between only the
following two alternatives:
Inequality under Certainty: Cure Ann and leave Bea to go wholly blind.
Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being: This treatment will either cure
Ann and be entirely ineffective for Bea (leaving her to go wholly blind),
or, instead, be entirely ineffective for Ann (leaving her to go wholly
blind) and cure Bea. These results are equally likely.
Our pluralist egalitarian view requires choosing the latter. For it is con-
cerned with limiting unfairness, and although both alternatives yield
unfair inequality in ﬁnal well-being, there is, on this view, less unfairness
overall when each is given an equal shot at a cure than when one child is
given a cure outright and the other has no chance at receiving it.15
Next, suppose that the decision-maker has a further alternative
available:
Equality under Risk: this treatment will either cure both children, or be
wholly ineffective for both, with each result being equally likely.
14. For discussion of a similar set of alternatives, see Luc Bovens, “Concerns for the
Poorly Off in Ordering Risky Prospects,” Economics and Philosophy 31 (2015): 397–429.
15. See, for example, Broome, “Uncertainty and Fairness;” Richard Arneson, “Postscript to
‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’,” in Equality: Selected Readings, ed. Louis Pojman
and Robert Westmoreland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 238—41 at p. 240; and
Larry Temkin, “Inequality: A Complex, Individualistic, and Comparative Notion,” Philosophical
Issues 11 (2001): 327–53, at pp. 337–9.
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On our egalitarian view, this alternative is superior to the preceding
two. For by ensuring that all are in the same boat, it eliminates all unfair
inequality without loss of expected total well-being.
Finally, suppose that the following alternative also becomes available:
Equality under Certainty: This treatment will improve both Ann’s and Bea’s
condition to that of a merely partial, but still substantial, visual impairment.
We will consider both cases in which the level of well-being associated with
this partial impairment is precisely halfway between the well-being associ-
ated with complete blindness and a full cure and cases in which this level
falls short of this halfway point. The shortfall is given by a cost c, with 0 ≤
c < 15.
On our egalitarian view, if c = 0, then Equality under Certainty is of
course better than the ﬁrst two inegalitarian alternatives, because it elimi-
nates inequality at no cost in expected total well-being. Moreover, Equality
under Certainty is precisely as good as Equality under Risk. In the absence
of inequality, this form of egalitarianism simply tells us to choose a best
prospect for each individual; because, for c = 0, both Equality under Risk
Table 1.
Alternative
Event
Draw from a risky urn
redr
(pred = 0.5)
blackr
(pblack = 0.5)
Inequality under Certainty
Ann 80 80
Bea 50 50
Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being
Ann 80 50
Bea 50 80
Equality under Risk
Ann 80 50
Bea 80 50
Equality under Certainty
Ann 65 − c 65 − c
Bea 65 − c 65 − c
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and Equality under Certainty offer each individual an expected well-being
of 65, both are equally good prospects for each person.
For a sufﬁciently small, positive cost (c > 0), Equality under Certainty
will still be chosen over the ﬁrst two alternatives, because it eliminates all
inequality with only a small reduction in expected total well-being. How-
ever, our egalitarian view will then regard it as inferior to Equality under
Risk, because the latter offers each individual better prospects while
ensuring equality.
III. A CAUTIOUS CRITERION FOR DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
We shall now explain how we propose to extend our pluralist egalitarian
view to cases of uncertainty. Let us start with a simple, one-person case.
Suppose that Ann will go wholly blind unless she is treated. You must
choose between providing Ann with an established risky treatment, which,
given the extensive evidence available, you conﬁdently believe has a 0.5
chance of curing her and a 0.5 chance of having no effect on her, and pro-
viding her with a novel, maximally uncertain treatment, which will either
lead to a full cure or else be entirely ineffective. There is no information
available on the probabilities associated with these possible outcomes of
the uncertain treatment. Moreover, you do not possess precise prior
beliefs about the probability of its effectiveness. Which treatment(s) is it
morally permissible for you to provide? And which would you choose?
There is evidence that many decision-makers’ answer to the latter
question would be the merely risky treatment. Part of this evidence is
that in a wide range of experiments involving self-interested choices, a
large share of decision-makers (typically: a majority) strictly prefer a
prospect in which they gain if a fair coin comes up heads to the same
gain on an event about which they know only that its probability may be
anything in a range from 0 to 1.16 They thereby display what is known as
“uncertainty (or ambiguity) aversion” on their own behalf. (Those who
are indifferent between this risky and uncertain prospect are commonly
described as “uncertainty [ambiguity] neutral”; those who strictly prefer
the uncertain prospect are known as “uncertainty [ambiguity] seeking.”)
And although there are less data on choices that concern others’
16. See Stefan Trautmann and Gijs van de Kuilen, “Ambiguity Attitudes,” in The Wiley
Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, ed. Gideon Keren and George Wu
(Chichester: Wiley, 2015), pp. 89–116, table 1.
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interests only, uncertainty aversion appears to be just as prevalent in
such decisions.17
The argument for holding that this common uncertainty-averse attitude
is morally and rationally permissible proceeds in two stages. The ﬁrst stage
pertains to belief formation. In this situation, by hypothesis, the combination
of your evidence and prior beliefs is compatible with a wide range of assign-
ments of probabilities to particular outcomes of the novel treatment.
You therefore lack sufﬁcient basis for a unique assignment of precise proba-
bilities to the possible outcomes of this treatment. Indeed, to make such an
assignment would seem to be arbitrary in the sense that it runs ahead of the
information you have and ignores other possible assignments that are no
less consistent with your prior beliefs and evidence. Neither rationality nor
morality requires the formation of beliefs that lack sufﬁcient foundation in
the evidence.18 You are therefore not required to adopt a single precise
assignment of probabilities to each possible outcome of the novel treatment.
Instead, it is reasonable for you to take account of the full range of probabil-
ity assignments that are supported by the data and your prior beliefs. In
other words, you may consider everything from the worst probability distri-
bution over the outcomes “wholly ineffective” and “full cure” that is consis-
tent with your evidence and prior beliefs (viz., that the novel treatment
provides Ann with no chance of a cure) to the best probability distribution
consistent with this information and these beliefs (viz., that it is sure to cure
her), without reducing them to a single probability distribution.
The second stage pertains to how this range of probability assignments over
pertinent outcomes can permissibly ﬁgure in your decision-making. The cen-
tral idea is that although you should assign some decision weight to both the
worse and better possible probability distributions over outcomes, how much
decision weight to assign to each is, within a considerable range of sensible
weights, up to you. Cautiously assigning somewhat greater decision weight to
the worse possible probability distributions than to the better ones is in this
17. See Christian Koenig-Kersting and Stefan Trautmann, “Ambiguity Attitudes in Deci-
sions for Others,” Economics Letters 146 (2016): 126–9 and Saposnik et al., “Decision-Making
in Multiple Sclerosis.”
18. James M. Joyce, “How Probabilities Reﬂect Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives:
Epistemology 19 (2005): 153–78, at pp. 168–71; Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, and David
Schmeidler, “Is It Always Rational to Satisfy Savage’s Axioms?” Economics and Philosophy
25 (2009): 285–96.
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sensible range.19 Such caution in the face of an inability to arrive at precise
probabilistic assignments is the central motivation for uncertainty aversion.
Our claim is not that uncertainty aversion is the only reasonable atti-
tude. It is merely that a moderate degree of such aversion is perfectly sen-
sible. Caution of the kind outlined could, we believe, be offered as a good
reason for a choice of the risky treatment over the uncertain treatment to
anyone concerned with Ann’s welfare.
We note, however, that despite its appeal, the rationality of uncertainty aver-
sion is controversial among decision theorists. The reason is that if one assumes,
as we have done, that under conditions of risk it is rationally required to obey
the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms, then uncertainty aversion and a central
axiom of decision theory, the Sure Thing Principle, cannot be reconciled.20
Moreover, violation of the Sure Thing Principle has unpalatable implications.21
19. See Ellsberg, “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms,” 643–69, and Risk, Ambiguity,
and Decision (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2001); Binmore, Rational Decisions; Gilboa et al.,
“Is It Always Rational to Satisfy Savage’s Axioms?,” 285–96, and Hare, “Risk and Radical
Uncertainty in HIV Research,” 87–9.
20. However, see Richard Bradley, Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017), sec. 9.5, for an argument that uncertainty aversion can be made
consistent with the Sure Thing Principle if one drops the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms.
21. The Sure Thing Principle is due to Leonard Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, 2nd
ed. (New York: Dover, 1972). It can be understood as follows (see Bradley, Decision Theory,
sec. 4.4). Consider Table n1, in which f, g, f 0, and g 0 are alternative acts, E and not-E are
events, and X, X*, Y, and Y* are constant outcomes (i.e., X is the same outcome no matter
whether generated through a combination of choosing f and the occurrence of E or through
choosing f 0 and the occurrence of E, etc. for X*, Y, and Y*).
Table n1.
Event
Alternative E not-E
f X Y
g X* Y
f 0 X Y*
g 0 X* Y*
Intuitively, f should be preferred to g just in case X should be preferred to X*. This is
because f and g have the same outcome whenever E is not the case, and therefore should be
evaluated solely in terms of their outcomes when E is the case. Consequently, any other alter-
natives such as f 0 and g 0, which have the same outcomes as f and g, respectively, whenever
E is the case, and identical outcomes when it is not, should be ranked in the same order as
f and g. In other words, the Sure-Thing Principle states that, in Table n1, f is preferred to g if
and only if f 0 is preferred to g 0. For an explanation of why uncertainty aversion can lead one
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The debate on whether one should conclude that uncertainty aversion
is irrational is extensive. Rather than reviewing this debate, we will simply
state our take on it, which is that there is a tension between independently
attractive principles of rationality, including, on the one hand, that ratio-
nality does not require a decision-maker to posit precise probabilities
when they lack sufﬁcient grounds for doing so and that a decision-maker
is entitled to be cautious in the face of such a lack, and, on the other
hand, that a decision-maker should respect other attractive principles of
rational choice. Different ways of “trading off” such incompatible ideal
standards of rationality are sensible, and among the sensible ways of
making trade-offs are uncertainty-averse decision principles.22
In the remainder of this article, we will therefore explore what would
follow if a degree of uncertainty aversion were both rationally and morally
acceptable. This question is worth exploring because uncertainty aversion
strikes us, many everyday decision-makers, and a considerable number of
experts as a reasonable attitude, and it gives rise to underexplored issues
of distributive justice.
Many uncertainty-averse decision criteria have been proposed. For
illustrative purposes, we will here use a simple but popular criterion ﬁrst
put forward by Leonard Hurwicz and later developed together with
Kenneth Arrow, which pays attention to only the least favorable and most
favorable probability distributions that are consistent with the decision-
maker’s information and prior beliefs.23 Our conclusions hold for all other
leading criteria, including those that give some weight to all probability
to violate this principle and for discussion of the problems to which this violation gives rise,
see Nabil Al-Najjar and Jonathan Weinstein, “The Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical
Assessment,” Economics and Philosophy 25 (2009): 249–84 and Fleurbaey, “Welfare Econom-
ics, Risk and Uncertainty,” Canadian Journal of Economics 51 (2018): 5–40, at pp. 29–32.
22. Here, we are agreeing with Gilboa et al., “Is It Always Rational to Satisfy Savage’s
Axioms?”; Marciano Siniscalchi, “Two Out of Three Ain’t Bad: A Comment on ‘The Ambiguity
Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment’,” Economics and Philosophy 25 (2009): 335–56;
Heal and Millner, “Uncertainty and Decision Making,” at pp. 129–30 and “Uncertainty and
Ambiguity,” at pp. 23–4.
23. Leonard Hurwicz, “Optimality Criteria for Decision Making under Ignorance,” Cowles
Commission Discussion Paper, Statistics 370 (1951), and Arrow and Hurwicz, “An Optimality
Criterion for Decision Making under Ignorance,” in Uncertainty and Expectations in
Economics, ed. Charles Carter and J. Ford (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), pp. 1—11. For dis-
cussion of this criterion, see Binmore, Rational Decisions; and Peter Wakker, Prospect Theory
for Risk and Uncertainty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), sec. 11.5.
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distributions that the decision-maker regards as consistent with their
evidence and beliefs.24
On what is known as the α-Hurwicz or α-maxmin criterion, one values
each person’s prospect at α × its expected value given the least favorable
probability distribution consistent with one’s information and prior beliefs
plus (1 − α) × its expected value given the most favorable probability dis-
tribution that is so consistent, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the Hurwicz pessimism–
optimism index. Uncertainty aversion involves giving more decision
weight to the least favorable possible probability distribution than to the
most favorable one; in other words, it involves taking α > 0.5. (The crite-
rion reduces to orthodox decision theory when a decision-maker uses a
single probability distribution.) In what follows, we will assume a
decision-maker who has a ﬁxed, permissible degree of uncertainty aver-
sion both when they evaluate a prospect for the sake of a single individual
and when they evaluate a multi-person prospect. This implies a constant
α > 0.5 for all decisions.
By way of illustration, consider the experimental treatment with which
we opened this section and which we represented by a case in which Ann
is cured if and only if a red ball is draw from a wholly uncertain urn. An
uncertainty-averse decision-maker who uses the α-maxmin criterion will
consider both the most pessimistic assessment of the information
available—according to which there are no red balls in this urn—and the
most optimistic assessment—according to which it contains only red balls.
Moreover, they will give at least somewhat greater weight to the former
than to the latter. Because of this cautious form of evaluation, they will
regard the uncertain treatment as less good for Ann, in prospect, than giv-
ing her a risky treatment which would carry a 0.5 probability of a full cure
and a 0.5 probability of being wholly ineffective. For example, a moderately
uncertainty-averse decision-maker for whom α = 0.6 will regard Ann’s
wholly uncertain prospect as equivalent to a treatment with an expected
value of 62 units of well-being or 3 units of expected well-being less than
this risky treatment. (Despite the fact that the criterion permits us to assign
such equivalents to uncertain prospects, the value of an uncertain prospect
when applying this criterion is not an expected value, because the decision
24. Our conclusions hold, for example, for the criteria proposed in Gilboa and Schmeidler,
“Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior,” and Klibanoff et al. “A Smooth Model of
Decision Making under Ambiguity.”
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weights applied to different possible probability distributions are not
probabilities. When we are discussing uncertain and/or risky prospects, we
therefore use the more general term “prospective value.”)
Although in this simple case of Ann’s experimental treatment this
criterion gives weight to both the worst and best possible outcome, this is
only because, in this example, the most pessimistic assignment of proba-
bilities is a certainty of failure and the most optimistic assignment of prob-
abilities is a certainty of a cure. Whenever the decision-maker can rule out
such extreme probability distributions, α-maxmin gives weight not to the
worst and best outcomes, but to the lowest and highest expected values
that the decision-maker assigns to the prospect. By way of illustration,
suppose that the decision-maker gained more information about this
novel treatment, so that the uncertainty involved was reduced as follows:
they now rationally conclude the treatment has between a 0.25 and 0.75
chance of curing Ann. The α-maxmin criterion evaluates this revised pros-
pect as follows: α times the most pessimistic assessment of its expected
value (viz., that there is a 0.25 chance of curing Ann) plus (1 − α) times
the most optimistic assessment of its expected value (that there is a 0.75
chance of curing Ann). Or, ﬁlling in the numbers:
α 0:25× 80 + 0:75× 50ð Þ + 1 – αð Þ 0:75× 80 + 0:25× 50ð Þ:
A moderately uncertainty-averse decision-maker for whom α = 0.6 will
therefore regard this partly uncertain treatment as equivalent to a treat-
ment with an expected value of 63.5 units of well-being or precisely in
between the value of the aforementioned wholly uncertain treatment and
the value of the aforementioned merely risky treatment, which has a 0.5
chance of effecting a cure. This illustrates that, on this criterion, reducing
the range of uncertainty also, naturally, reduces the depressing effect it
has on the value of a prospect.
IV. WHEN REDUCING UNCERTAINTY AND LIMITING INEQUALITY ARE CONGRUENT
We will now review ways in which adding uncertainty aversion to our
egalitarian view generates novel implications. We ﬁrst focus on cases in
which the aim of reducing uncertainty does not conﬂict with the aim of
reducing inequality. (We deal with conﬂicts between these aims in the
next section.)
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Suppose that a decision-maker must choose between the aforemen-
tioned Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being and the following:
Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being: This treatment will either cure
Ann and leave Bea wholly blind or cure Bea and leave Ann wholly blind,
with no information available about the probability of either outcome.
These alternatives are displayed in Table 2. We use redu (blacku) to sig-
nify the event of a red (black) ball being drawn from an uncertain urn.
Our pluralistic view requires that we take account of both the distribution
of individuals’ prospects and the prospective value of the possible anon-
ymized distributions of ﬁnal well-being. Let us consider each in turn. The
risky alternative ensures equality of prospects, as does the uncertain alterna-
tive. However, the uncertain alternative gives each individual a less valuable
prospect than its risky counterpart. Considering individuals’ prospects, there-
fore, Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being is clearly superior. Furthermore,
in terms of the prospective value of the possible distributions of ﬁnal well-
being, the two are equivalent. For, under each of these alternatives, the
anonymized distribution of ﬁnal well-being is certain: one person will be fully
cured, another will go wholly blind. One can therefore say that although one
of these alternatives contains individual-level uncertainty, neither contains
Table 2.
Alternative
Event
Draw from a risky urn
redr
(pred = 0.5)
blackr
(pblack = 0.5)
Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being
Ann 80 50
Bea 50 80
Draw from an uncertain urn
redu
(0 ≤ pred ≤ 1)
blacku
(0 ≤ pblack ≤ 1)
Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being
Ann 80 50
Bea 50 80
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any population-level uncertainty. All things considered, Equal Risk, Unequal
Final Well-being is therefore more choiceworthy, but only because it avoids
the depressing effect of uncertainty on the value of individuals’ prospects.
Now imagine a choice between the aforementioned Equality under Risk
and the following:
Equality under Uncertainty: This treatment will either cure both chil-
dren or leave them both to go wholly blind, with no information avail-
able about the probability of either outcome.
These alternatives are depicted in Table 3. In this case, both a concern for
individuals’ prospects and a concern for the prospective value of the possible
anonymized distributions of ﬁnal well-being point in the same direction. Equal-
ity under Uncertainty offers each individual a less valuable prospect. Moreover,
it generates population-level uncertainty, because the decision-maker is uncer-
tain about the anonymized distribution of ﬁnal well-being. This lowers the value
of Equality under Uncertainty, because the worst possible probability distribu-
tion (i.e., that the probability that both individuals are cured is 0) receives
greater weight than the best possible probability distribution (i.e., that the prob-
ability that both are cured is 1). An uncertainty-averse view will therefore have
two reasons for judging that it is better to opt for Equality under Risk.
Table 3.
Alternative
Event
Draw from a risky urn
redr
(pred = 0.5)
blackr
(pblack = 0.5)
Equality under Risk
Ann 80 50
Bea 80 50
Draw from an uncertain urn
redu
(0 ≤ pred ≤ 1)
blacku
(0 ≤ pblack ≤ 1)
Equality under Uncertainty
Ann 80 50
Bea 80 50
254 Philosophy & Public Affairs
So far, we have analyzed cases in which, while keeping inequality con-
stant, a decision-maker can ensure less uncertainty. Now, we will consider
a case in which, keeping total uncertainty constant, a decision-maker can
equalize its burden.
Suppose that a decision-maker must choose between the following:
Unequal Uncertainty: Ann is given a novel treatment which will either
cure her or instead leave her wholly blind, with no information about
the probability of either outcome. Bea is given a distinct treatment
which will either, with probability 0.5, cure her or, with probability 0.5,
leave her wholly blind.
Equal Moderate Uncertainty: Ann and Bea are each given different dis-
tinct, moderately uncertain treatments, each of which will either offer a
Table 4.
Alternative
Event
Draw from wholly uncertain urn for Ann, risky urn for Bea
redu, redr redu, blackr blacku, redr blacku, blackr
Unequal Uncertainty
Worst prob. distrib.25 0 0 0.5 0.5
Best prob. distrib. 0.5 0.5 0 0
Ann 80 80 50 50
Bea 80 50 80 50
Draws from distinct, partly uncertain urns for Ann and Bea
redu, redu redu, blacku blacku, redu blacku, blacku
Equal Moderate Uncertainty
Worst prob. distrib.26 0.0625 0.1875 0.1875 0.5625
Best prob. distrib. 0.5625 0.1875 0.1875 0.0625
Ann 80 80 50 50
Bea 80 50 80 50
25. One arrives at the worst (best) distribution by assuming the smallest (largest) share of
red balls in Ann’s uncertain urn consistent with the available evidence, namely, 0 (1).
26. One arrives at the worst (best) distribution by assuming the smallest (largest) share of
red balls in Ann’s and Bea’s uncertain urns consistent with the available evidence, namely,
0.25 (0.75) in each urn.
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full cure or leave its recipient wholly blind. For each of their treatments,
the probability of a cure ranges from 0.25 to 0.75.
These alternatives are represented in Table 4.
The choice between Unequal Uncertainty and Equal Moderate Uncer-
tainty can be thought of as follows. Ann and Bea each face a draw from a
separate urn. Each receives a cure if a red ball is drawn from their urn; if
a black ball is drawn, their treatment is ineffective. The decision-maker
must ﬁll each urn with 100 balls. They have four bags of 50 balls each: two
risky bags containing an equal mix of red and black balls and two wholly
uncertain bags about which the decision-maker has no information except
that they can be any proportion of red and black. If they empty both
uncertain bags into Ann’s urn and both risky bags into Bea’s urn, then
they generate Unequal Uncertainty. By contrast, if they ﬁll each urn with
one uncertain and one risky bag, then they generate Equal Moderate
Uncertainty. The former places all the burden of uncertainty on Ann’s
prospects. By contrast, the latter equalizes the burden of uncertainty.
Moreover, it is natural to suppose that the total burden created by the
uncertain balls is not increased when they are divided equally.27 From
the perspective of the distribution of the value of individuals’ prospects,
therefore, Equal Moderate Uncertainty is clearly superior.
We must also consider the prospective value of the possible anon-
ymized distributions of ﬁnal well-being associated with each of these
alternatives. Using the α-maxmin criterion, it is sufﬁcient to consider
only the worst and best among the possible probability distributions,
which are listed in Table 4. Now, under Unequal Uncertainty, in both
the pessimistic scenario (i.e., Ann’s urn contains no red balls) and the
optimistic scenario (i.e., Ann’s urn contains red balls only), an unequal
outcome—in which only one person is cured—has a probability of 0.5.
(This is the sum of the probabilities for the events {redu, blackr} and
{blacku, redr}.) By contrast, under Equal Moderate Uncertainty, in both
the pessimistic and optimistic scenario, the probability of an unequal
27. Indeed, according to the α-maxmin criterion, under Unequal Uncertainty, the value of
Ann’s prospects is 50α + 80(1 – α) and the value of Bea’s prospects is 65. Under Equal Moder-
ate Uncertainty, the value of Ann’s prospects is α(0.25 × 80 + 0.75 × 50) + (1 – α)
(0.75 × 80 + 0.25 × 50); the same is true of Bea’s prospects. In both cases, the total value is
therefore 145 − 30α. An egalitarian view that incorporates α-maxmin will therefore hold
Equal Moderate Uncertainty is superior because it distributes this total more equally.
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outcome is 0.375. In other words, Equal Moderate Uncertainty makes an
unequal outcome less likely no matter whether the odds are stacked
against the person(s) facing uncertainty or whether the odds are in their
favor. This makes it better from the perspective of the prospective value
of the anonymized distribution of ﬁnal well-being.28 We can conclude
that our uncertainty-averse egalitarian view yields the plausible verdict
that one should distribute the burden of uncertainty equally.
Our view does not merely posit a novel object of egalitarian concern
(the disvalue of uncertainty); it also lends additional force to the egalitar-
ian aim of directing aid toward those who end up less well off than others.
By way of illustration, suppose that our decision-maker must choose
between Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being and Equality under
Table 5.
Alternative
Event
Draw from an uncertain urn
redu
(0 ≤ pred ≤ 1)
blacku
(0 ≤ pblack ≤ 1)
Equal Uncertainty, Unequal
Final Well-being
Ann 80 50
Bea 50 80
Equality under Certainty
Ann 65 − c 65 − c
Bea 65 − c 65 − c
28. More precisely, and writing v{80, 50} for the value of a distribution in which one
person gets 80 and another one gets 50, the prospective value that the α-maxmin criterion
assigns to the distribution of ﬁnal well-being under Equal Moderate Uncertainty minus the
prospective value that it assigns to the distribution of ﬁnal well-being under Unequal
Uncertainty is:
0.0675 × (v{80, 80} − v{80, 50}) − 0.0675 × (v{80, 50} − v{50, 50}).
This expression will be positive just in case “leveling up” from (80, 50) to (80, 80) gener-
ates more moral value than “leveling down” from (80, 50) to (50, 50) destroys. And, this will
be true on our pluralistic egalitarian view. This is because the added 30 units of well-being in
the leveling up scenario are valuable because they are good for a person and reduce inequal-
ity. By contrast, the disvalue of the lost 30 units of well-being in the leveling down scenario is
tempered by the fact that their loss reduces inequality.
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Certainty. For convenience, both are represented in Table 5. Recall that
c is the cost of achieving both equality and certainty, with 0 ≤ c < 15.
Let us again consider both the value of individuals’ prospects and the
prospective value of the anonymized distribution of ﬁnal well-being.
Under Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being, the value of each
individual’s prospect is depressed by the fact that the decision-maker has
no information about their chance of ending up disadvantaged. The
badness of this uncertainty for an individual is determined by the gap
between the expected value of this individual’s prospects given the possible
probability distribution that is least favorable to them and the expected
value of this individual’s prospects given the possible probability distribu-
tion that is most favorable to them. Equality under Certainty is valuable
because it altogether eliminates this gap. From the perspective of the value
of individuals’ prospects, an uncertainty-averse decision-maker should
therefore be willing to incur a cost (c > 0) to eliminate this uncertainty.
Turning to the prospective value of the possible distributions of ﬁnal
well-being, a drawback of Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being is,
naturally, the certainty of outcome inequality. An inequality-averse
decision-maker will therefore be willing to pay a price (c > 0) to eliminate
this inequality.
Overall, both uncertainty aversion and inequality aversion will prompt us
to incur a cost to remove inequality. Moreover, jointly, they will justify paying
a higher price to achieve equality than either alone would. To see why, sup-
pose for the moment that our decision-maker remained inequality averse but
became indifferent to uncertainty (i.e., their α = 0.5). They would then evalu-
ate Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being as equivalent to Equal Risk,
Unequal Final Well-being (the latter is described in Table 1). Suppose that to
eliminate the inequality of ﬁnal well-being in these alternatives, it is right to
incur up to, but no more than, a cost to each person of c* units of expected
well-being. We can then say that, for an uncertainty-neutral, but inequality-
averse decision-maker, both Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being and
Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being are equivalent to giving each of Ann and
Bea 65 − c* for certain.
Now suppose that our decision-maker regained their uncertainty aver-
sion. They would then regard Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being
as worse than Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being. By transitivity, they
would regard the uncertain alternative as worse than giving both Ann and
Bea 65 − c* for certain. In other words, they would regard Equal
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Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being as equivalent to Equality under Cer-
tainty only for a cost larger than c*. It follows that an uncertainty-averse
egalitarian view justiﬁes incurring a larger cost to achieve both equality
and certainty than an uncertainty-neutral egalitarian view would
countenance.
Let us summarize the distinctive implications of our view uncovered in this
section. First, and straightforwardly, it will favor situations in which a better
basis is available for assigning probabilities to outcomes. This is illustrated by
the stylized choices in Tables 2 and 3. In real-world cases, the view will there-
fore display a tendency to favor policies with an extensive evidence base over
ones with a minimal evidence base, keeping other things equal. Under these
circumstances, it will also favor familiar over unfamiliar treatments for patients
and make the provision of the latter harder to justify.29
Second, the proposed view posits an additional object of egalitarian
concern, namely, the burden of uncertainty. In general, it implies that
there is unfairness in situations in which some face a greater burden of
uncertainty than others, either because there is less information about the
likelihood of the possible threats they face or because there is much more
at stake for them. The case outlined in Table 4 provides a stylized exam-
ple. A realistic case in which such inequality is of concern is climate pol-
icy. For it is likely that people in poorer nations who inhabit marginal
lands and who are dependent on the weather for their livelihood face
larger burdens of uncertainty than urbanites in wealthy countries.
Third, in uncertain situations in which we know that one person’s good
fortune will be the counterpart of another’s misfortune, uncertainty aversion
and inequality aversion point us in the same direction. In such situations,
steering beneﬁts to whoever turns out to be less fortunate reduces the stakes
for each person and thereby lessens the burden of uncertainty; of course, it
also reduces inequality in ﬁnal well-being. Table 5 provides an example
where this process of improving the lot of the worst off can be pursued to
the point of equality, but the impulse toward equality will be present even
when perfect equality cannot be reached. A policy issue to which this may
be relevant is the taxation of returns from complex ﬁnancial instruments
held by pension funds on behalf of ordinary workers. These instruments are
uncertain prospects that will yield both winners and losers. Measures that
dampen the variability of returns (e.g., taxing gains and allowing a tax
29. Cf. Saposnik et al., “Decision-Making in Multiple Sclerosis.”
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deduction for losses) will be valuable both because they reduce uncertainty
and because they decrease inequality in ﬁnal well-being.30
V. WHEN REDUCING UNCERTAINTY AND LIMITING INEQUALITY ARE AT ODDS
We now turn to cases in which uncertainty aversion and inequality aver-
sion pull in opposite directions. By way of illustration, imagine a choice
between the aforementioned alternatives Equal Uncertainty, Unequal
Final Well-being and Equality under Uncertainty as depicted in Table 6.
In this case, in terms of the prospects they grant individuals, both alter-
natives are equivalent. However, in terms of the prospective value of the
possible distributions of ﬁnal well-being they generate, matters are less
straightforward. If the decision-maker chooses Equal Uncertainty, Unequal
Final Well-being, they can be certain that one person will be cured and
one will go wholly blind. But this absence of population-level uncertainty
about the anonymized distribution of ﬁnal well-being comes at the cost of
guaranteed inequality. If, instead, they choose Equality under Uncertainty,
Table 6.
Alternative
Event
Draw from an uncertain urn
redu
(0 ≤ pred ≤ 1)
blacku
(0 ≤ pblack ≤ 1)
Equal Uncertainty, Unequal
Final Well-being
Ann 80 50
Bea 50 80
Equality under Uncertainty
Ann 80 50
Bea 80 50
30. Although some investors in such instruments may be adequately informed and wholly
responsible for their choice of investments (so that a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian may
have attenuated reason for being concerned with inequalities that result), many of the returns
also come to participants in funds who should not be held fully responsible for the relevant
investment decisions (see, e.g., Michael Lewis, The Big Short [New York: Norton, 2010],
chap. 6, recounting how, among others, Japanese farmers’ unions and European pension
funds were exposed to swings in the value of collateralized debt obligations). Inequalities in
ﬁnal well-being between such investors should concern egalitarians.
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there will be guaranteed equality, because Ann and Bea will either both
go wholly blind or both be cured. But the fact that they will either sink or
swim together generates substantial uncertainty regarding the value of the
distribution of ﬁnal well-being.
The view we are developing is silent on the choice between these
alternatives. It assumes only that some degree of inequality aversion is
required and that some degree of uncertainty aversion is both permissible
and adopted by the decision-maker. Consistently with these commit-
ments, decision-makers may decide this case differently. A decision-maker
who is strongly inequality averse but only slightly uncertainty averse will
choose Equality under Uncertainty; a decision-maker who is only slightly
inequality averse but very averse to uncertainty will favor Equal Uncer-
tainty, Unequal Final Well-being. Here, we will not argue that one of these
ways of trading off the two concerns is uniquely right; the key conclusion
is simply that our view incorporates some resistance to the egalitarian
impulse to bind people’s fates together.
One further important lesson about how uncertainty aversion changes
egalitarianism is this. Under risk, our egalitarian view embodies a tendency
to allocate beneﬁts away from the fortunate and toward the unfortunate
when and only when the former are (or would be) better off than others and
the latter are (or would be) worse off than others. This is illustrated by
the fact that in choosing between Equality under Risk and Equality under
Certainty in Table 1, our view is unwilling to pay any cost to redistribute
from the fortunate potential futures of Ann and Bea to their less fortunate
potential futures. By contrast, under uncertainty, our view embodies a
Table 7.
Event
Draw from an uncertain urn
Alternative
redu
(0 ≤ pred ≤ 1)
blacku
(0 ≤ pblack ≤ 1)
Equality under Uncertainty
Ann 80 50
Bea 80 50
Equality under Certainty
Ann 65 − c 65 − c
Bea 65 − c 65 − c
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tendency to direct beneﬁts from the fortunate toward the unfortunate even
when these are merely two potential futures of the same person and there
is no inequality. To see this, compare Equality under Uncertainty with
Equality under Certainty, which are both depicted in Table 7. Due to
uncertainty aversion, for some sufﬁciently small, positive c, Equality under
Certainty is superior to Equality under Uncertainty; this is indicative of the
cost our view is willing to pay to reduce the burden of uncertainty by direct-
ing beneﬁts away from Ann and Bea’s better potential futures toward their
worse potential futures.
To be sure, on our view, the strength of this tendency to allocate bene-
ﬁts away from the fortunate and toward the unfortunate will be strongest
when it both reduces inequality between people and reduces the disvalue
of uncertainty for each person. Nonetheless, the predilection in uncertain
situations to direct resources toward all victims of misfortune is striking. It
follows from this view that we have special reason to make provision for
possible adversity to which we cannot assign a precise probability, even if
this adversity would, if it occurred, equally affect everyone in the collectiv-
ity with which we are concerned. A realistic case may be the purchase of a
ﬁnancial hedge for uncertain and volatile revenues from a country’s col-
lectively owned natural resources, to protect against a downturn that
would depress all citizens’ livelihoods.31
VI. UNCERTAINTY, PARETO, AND ANTI-EGALITARIANISM
We shall now demonstrate that the permissibility of uncertainty aversion
should lead us to reassess a common argument against the kind of egali-
tarianism we have been developing. Consider the following principle:
Pareto for Prospects: If, for every person, a ﬁrst alternative provides a
more valuable prospect than a second, then the ﬁrst alternative should
be chosen over the second.
31. If, the quotation from Keynes in Section I suggests, one were to regard the oil price as
uncertain, then the Mexican government’s hedging program may provide a concrete exam-
ple. See Reuters News Agency, “Mexico Wraps $1.1 Billion Oil Options Hedge to Lock in $49
Floor,” August 20, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-oil-idUSKCN0QP0X020
150820. Accessed August 12, 2017.
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The motivation for this principle is that a social decision-maker should
choose an alternative that could be chosen for the sake of each person, if
such an alternative exists. The principle holds that an alternative is more
choiceworthy for a person’s sake just in case it has greater prospective
value for that person.
It is well known that the egalitarian view under consideration can vio-
late Pareto for Prospects. By way of illustration, consider a choice between
Equality under Certainty and Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being (see
Table 1). For a sufﬁciently small cost c, our pluralist egalitarian view
chooses the former, because it eliminates all forms of unfair inequality,
although it yields less valuable prospects for each person. Some regard
this as a reason to favor utilitarianism, which, they allege, does not conﬂict
with Pareto for Prospects.32
However, if, as we have argued, uncertainty aversion is permissible,
then utilitarians are not well placed to advance this argument, because
utilitarianism will also violate Pareto for Prospects. Consider the choice
between Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being and Equality under
Certainty outlined in Table 5. An uncertainty-averse evaluation of each
individual’s prospects yields the result that for some sufﬁciently small,
positive c, Equality under Certainty gives each individual more valuable
prospects. Pareto for Prospects therefore holds that for a sufﬁciently small,
positive c, one must choose Equality under Certainty. However, for all
c > 0, Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being is guaranteed to yield
more total well-being, so that a utilitarian must choose it.33
32. See, for example, Harsanyi, “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility,” Journal of Political Economy 63 (1955): 309–21, and McCarthy, “Dis-
tributive Equality.” For a response to this objection to egalitarianism, see Fleurbaey and Voor-
hoeve, “Decide as You Would with Full Information! An Argument against ex ante Pareto,” in
Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures and Ethics, ed. Nir Eyal, Samia Hurst, and Ole
Frithjof Norheim (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 113–28.
33. Indeed, assuming uncertainty aversion, this case demonstrates a tension between
Pareto for Prospects and all views about the value of an anonymized distribution of ﬁnal
well-being. To see why, assume a speciﬁc degree of uncertainty aversion by the decision-
maker on an individual’s behalf. This degree will imply a speciﬁc, positive cost for which it is,
prospectively, just as good for an individual to face Equality under Certainty as it is to face
Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being. Call this cost c* (with c* > 0) (e.g., using the
α-maxmin criterion, if α = 0.6, then c* = 3). For any cost larger than c*, Pareto for Prospects
will demand the choice of Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being. For any cost smaller
than c*, Pareto for Prospects will demand the choice of Equality under Certainty. Now con-
sider the value of the anonymized distribution of well-being associated with these alterna-
tives. For both alternatives, this distribution is certain. The question is therefore how the
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We draw two conclusions from these ﬁndings. The ﬁrst concerns the
dialectic between utilitarians and egalitarians: only those utilitarians who
deny the permissibility of uncertainty aversion can consistently reject
egalitarianism simply because it violates Pareto for Prospects. Utilitarians
who grant the permissibility of uncertainty aversion might, of course, offer
the following, weaker objection to egalitarianism. “Egalitarianism violates
Pareto for Prospects under conditions of both risk and uncertainty,
whereas utilitarianism violates it under conditions of uncertainty alone. It
counts in favor of a view if it violates it in a more limited set of conditions.
Therefore, utilitarianism is, in one respect at least, superior to egalitarian-
ism.” This objection, however, grants that violating Pareto for Prospects is
not a deal breaker. And once one is permitted to violate this principle for
the sake of improving total ﬁnal well-being, why would one not also be
permitted to do so for the sake of reducing inequality?
Our second conclusion is substantive. By focusing only on each individ-
ual’s prospects, considered separately, Pareto for Prospects is insensitive
to how combinations of these prospects give rise to possible patterns of
ﬁnal well-being. But these patterns matter, both because they determine
the fairness of the eventual outcome and because they determine how
much uncertainty about the value of the distribution of ﬁnal well-being a
social decision-maker faces. After all, a decision-maker is in a very differ-
ent situation when some will deﬁnitely end up better off than others than
when no such inequality can arise. They are also in a different situation
when they can accurately predict the impact of their policies at a popula-
tion level than when they must contend with a wide range of possible
population-level outcomes and are not in a position to assign precise
probabilities to these outcomes. That Pareto for Prospects does not
value of a distribution in which one person has 80 and another one has 50 compares with
the value of a distribution in which both people have 65 − c. Every theory about the value of
a distribution of ﬁnal well-being will have a cost for which these two are equivalent. For a
utilitarian, as we have seen, this is c = 0; for a pluralist egalitarian, it is some c > 0, with the
size of the cost determined by the degree of inequality aversion; and so on for every other
view. Now, whatever this distributive theory is, there is no reason that the cost at which it
regards these two distributions of ﬁnal well-being as equivalent should be precisely the cost
c* at which the two distributions offer each individual equivalent prospects. It follows that, if
uncertainty aversion is permissible, any view that gives substantial weight to the value of
anonymized distributions of ﬁnal well-being will violate Pareto for Prospects. (We thank
Richard Bradley for drawing our attention to this implication.)
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permit decision-makers to take account of these differences is, we submit,
a reason to reject it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Uncertain situations are ubiquitous. A common and, we have argued, per-
missible attitude in such situations is for a decision-maker to keep in mind
the full range of distributions of probabilities over outcomes consistent
with their limited evidence and prior beliefs and to respond cautiously to
this range by giving some additional decision weight to the less favorable
probability distributions within it. We have here explored what would
follow if such an uncertainty-averse attitude was incorporated into a
plausible egalitarian theory.
We highlight four implications of this view. First, and most straightfor-
wardly, it favors risky alternatives over alternatives for which the decision-
maker is not in a position to assign precise probabilities to possible
outcomes. It therefore regards courses of action that avoidably involve
uncertain possibilities of success and failure as difﬁcult to justify. For
example, it holds that it is more difﬁcult to justify enrolling people in an
experimental treatment when an alternative is available with well-
established risks.34
Second, our view identiﬁes the disvalue of uncertainty as a new object
of egalitarian concern. It can thereby justify special efforts to improve the
prospects of those who face a larger burden of uncertainty, by improving
information-gathering and making provision to improve their lot should
the current, imprecisely estimated odds prove to be against them. A perti-
nent case is the possible effects of climate change on people whose lives
and livelihoods would be threatened by large temperature rises or by
changes in precipitation.
Third, in uncertain situations, uncertainty aversion serves as a counter-
weight to the egalitarian impulse to bind people’s fates together. In such
situations, ensuring that either everyone or no one is beneﬁtted creates an
uncertain possibility of collective misfortune, which the view will regard as
especially problematic.
Fourth, in uncertain situations, the proposed view justiﬁes directing
beneﬁts away from the fortunate and toward the unfortunate both when
34. Hare, “Risk and Radical Uncertainty in HIV Research.”
265 Egalitarianism under Severe
Uncertainty
they are different people and when they are merely different possible
futures of the same person. It therefore adds force to the egalitarian
impulse to resolve interpersonal trade-offs to the beneﬁt of the less well-
off. It also introduces a novel reason, namely, the reduction of the
depressing effect of uncertainty on the value of an individual’s prospects,
to resolve intrapersonal trade-offs in a manner that makes special provi-
sion for the least fortunate potential future of the person concerned. This
implication is relevant to justiﬁcations for a social safety net. As egalitar-
ians have commonly understood this institution, it serves both to reduce
inequalities and improve people’s prospects by mitigating risks pertaining
to income and health.35 But where such a safety net must operate not
merely under conditions of risk but also under uncertainty, our view
provides the following additional reasons for its maintenance and expan-
sion. By improving the fate of the worst off, a social safety net reduces
both the depressing effect that individual-level uncertainty has on the
value of individuals’ prospects and population-level uncertainty about the
value of the distribution of ﬁnal well-being.
Finally, let us revisit our initial case involving the UK’s policy in the face
of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Analyses of the actual decision-making pro-
cess reveal that key decision-makers in the civil service and the UK Gov-
ernment evaluated all courses of action exclusively in terms of their
impact in the event of a devastating epidemic that would, if the more
extensive of the contemplated policies were not implemented, claim
between 65,000 and 750,000 lives.36 Consequently, the government chose to
invest the maximal amount in response to the threat. As it turned out, the
virus was not particularly dangerous and the death toll was 457. Of course,
this outcome alone does not show that the decision-making process at the
time was ﬂawed. However, some commentators have derided the UK
Government’s exclusive focus on the worst range of outcomes as excessively
cautious and wasteful. They have suggested that, instead, it could have
35. See, for example, Nicholas Barr, The Economics of the Welfare State, 5th ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012); Michael Otsuka, “How to Guard against the Risk of Living too
Long: The Case for Collective Pensions,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Vol. III,
ed. David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2017),
pp. 229–51; and Alex Voorhoeve, “May a Government Mandate more Comprehensive Health
Insurance than Individuals Want for Themselves?” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy,
Vol. IV, ed. Sobel, Vallentyne and Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 167–91.
36. Hine, An Independent Review of the UK Response to the 2009 Inﬂuenza Pandemic; Oli-
ver, “Ambiguity Aversion and the UK Government’s Response to Swine Flu,” 16–31.
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made an “informed guess” assignment of precise probabilities to each pos-
sible outcome and then conducted a standard expected value calculation
for each policy alternative.37 This orthodox approach, however, has its own
problems, because it demands that public decision-makers come up with a
precise probability for every relevant outcome when even experts are
unable to do so. Using such unfounded probabilities would seem hard to
justify publicly. And in the absence of such a unique probability distribu-
tion, the proposed expected value analysis cannot be carried out.
The approach we have outlined here is, we submit, an attractive alter-
native to both the government’s exclusive focus on the worst case scenario
and such orthodox expected value analysis. There are two points at which
our proposed approach differs from “assuming the worst.” First, it focuses
special attention on the least favorable probability distribution over out-
comes consistent with available data and reasonable prior beliefs. That is,
it focuses on the worst expected value rather than on the worst outcome. It
is only in a case of complete ignorance that the worst expected value and
the worst outcome are identical. As commentators have pointed out, the
historical record of ﬂu pandemics, alongside incoming information about
the nature of the H1N1 virus, ensured the situation was not one of com-
plete ignorance. This, they claim, made it unreasonable to reason as if the
worst case was certain to occur.38 If these observers are correct, then
among all the probability distributions over outcomes in a sensible range,
even the most negative would assign some probability to scenarios other
than the worst.
Second, uncertainty aversion does not require giving decision weight
only to the most negatively assessed expected value; it merely involves
cautiously giving such gloomy estimates of expected value somewhat
greater decision weight than more favorable assessments. Although this
leaves a degree of freedom about these decision weights, a choice of
such weights for high-stakes public decision-making under uncertainty
strikes us as an unavoidable value judgment that is best openly
debated.
37. See, for example, Oliver, “Ambiguity Aversion and the UK Government’s Response to
Swine Flu,” 29–30.
38. See, for example, Oliver, “Ambiguity Aversion and the UK Government’s Response to
Swine Flu,” 29–30; Hine, An Independent Review of the UK Response to the 2009 Inﬂuenza
Pandemic, chap. 3.
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Our critique of the UK Government’s exclusive focus on the worst case
does not, of course, show that substantial investment in pandemic pre-
paredness was unwarranted. Indeed, our uncertainty-averse, egalitarian
view identiﬁes several reasons to consider such investment as valuable at
the moment of decision. First, by improving individuals’ outcomes in the
event that the pandemic had turned out to be severe, it mitigated the
depressing effect of uncertainty on the value of individuals’ prospects.
Second, limiting the number of deaths in this unfortunate eventuality alle-
viated population-level uncertainty. Finally, given that the impact of a
severe epidemic on people’s lives would have been highly disparate (with
some, including many young people, dying and many more surviving),
investment in saving lives if the pandemic had proven to be severe
lowered the prospective degree of inequality in ﬁnal well-being. Overall,
besides demonstrating the value of an approach that treats decisions
under uncertainty differently from merely risky decisions, this case high-
lights a central conclusion of our analysis, which is that uncertainty
aversion both reinforces egalitarian reasons and provides new reasons to
improve the lot of the unfortunate.
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